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Siwica: Environmental Law: Wetlands Regulation Prevents Harm

CASE COMMENTS
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: WETLANDS REGULATION
PREVENTS HARM
Graham v. Estuary Properties,*

399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981)
In 1975, respondent, Estuary Properties, Inc., completed plans to develop
several thousand acres of land in an ecologically sensitive area of Lee County
along the southwest coast of Florida.: As respondent was aware of environ-

mental restrictions when it acquired the land, it planned to preserve 2,800
acres of red mangroves.2 The development plan would have, however, necessitated the destruction of 1,800 acres of black mangrove forest which played a

crucial role in the region's ecosystem. Because the proposed development
would have regional ecological impact, 4 respondent was statutorily required to
apply to the Lee Board of County Commissioners for a development of regional

impact permit.5 The Board denied the permit upon recommendation of the
Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council 6 which had concluded the pro-

posed mangrove destruction would beget pollution7 Nonetheless, the Board
*EvrroR's NoTr: This case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the outstanding case comment submitted by a Junior Candidate in the Spring 1981 quarter.
1. 399 So. 2d 1374, 1376 (Fla. 1981). The land at issue consists predominantly of wetlands
along Estero, San Carlos, Hurricane, and Hell-Peckish Bays. The property includes 2,800

acres of red mangroves on the edge of the bays. The remaining acreage begins at the salina
and includes only 526 acres which have been classified as non-wetlands. Respondent planned
to build a 26,00 unit housing development inland of the mangroves. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id. Integral to the wetland's ecosystem was the tide flushing through the red mangroves
into the black mangroves. Id. The plan required the black mangroves to be replaced with an
interceptor waterway designed to replace the ecological functions of the mangroves. Id. For a
discussion of the importance of wetlands see Binder, Taking Versus Reasonable Regulation:
A Reappraisalin Light of Regional Planningand Wetlands, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 1, 18-30 (1972).
4. 399 So. 2d at 1376. A development of regional impact (DRI) is "any development
which because of its character, magnitude, or location, would have a substantial effect upon
the health, safety, or welfare of citizens of more than one county." FLA. STAT. §380.06(1) (1979).
5. 399 So. 2d at 1376. FLA. STAT. §380.06(6) (1979) provides than any person planning
a development of regional impact must file an application for approval with the appropriate
local government. The local government that receives the application is required to notify the
appropriate regional planning agency which will then prepare a report and recommend
whether permission should be granted in light of the regional impact. Id. §380.06(7). The
report is based on a consideration of the factors set forth in the statute. Id. §380.06(8). Upon
receiving the recommendation from the regional planning agency, the local government holds
a hearing pursuant to normal zoning regulation to consider the application. Id. §380.06(7).
6. 899 So. 2d at 1376. The Commission could not make a decision regarding the permit
without first consulting the appropriate regional planning agency. FLA. STAT. §880.06(7) (1979).
7. 899 So. 2d at 1376. The Commissioners adopted the Southwest Florida Regional
Planning Council's (SWFRPC) findings that "extensive site alterations will be required for
the development which will result in the destruction of large acreages of mangroves and
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indicated it would approve a development half the originally designed size.8
Respondent appealed 9 to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission which approved the denial.' 0 On further review, the First District Court
of Appeal ruled the permit denial had violated statutory mandates," and also
constituted a taking of property for a public purpose without just compensation in violation of the state and federal constitutions."2 On certiorari, the
Supreme Court of Florida, addressing the taking issue, reversed and HELD,
denial of the permit was not an unconstitutional taking of respondent's property.' 8

other wetlands vegetation and cause the alteration of a long established ecosystem .... The
drainage system as proposed will create a potential negative water quality impact on San
Carlos Bay and the Estero Bay Aquatic Preserve. The proposed interceptor waterway has
never been tested in actual usage and it has not been shown that it will not create a negative
water quality impact .. " Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126, 1129 (Fla. 1st
D.C.A. 1979). The Commission then stated that to obtain a permit Estuary would have to
eliminate the proposed interceptor waterway and avoid the destruction of large acreages of
red and black mangroves forest within the proposed development site. Id. at 1130-31.
8. 399 So. 2d at 1377.
9. Id. FLA. STAT. §380.07(2) (1979) allows developers to appeal to the Commission whenever a local government denies permission for a development of regional impact.
10. 399 So. 2d at 1377. The Commission adopted the denial recommendation of the
hearing officer who concluded that the mangrove destruction would cause pollution and harm
the Lee County economy and that the restriction met the reasonableness requirements of
section 380. Id.
11. 381 So. 2d 1126, 1132 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1979). Specifically, the First District Court of
Appeal ruled: (1) the Adjudicatory Commission failed to balance the interests of the state
against the interests of the private property owner as required in section 380.07; (2) the
Adjudicatory Commission erred by forcing appellant to prove the development would not
have an adverse environmental impact; and (3)the Commission failed to indicate the changes
necessary to obtain the permit as required by section 380.08(3). Id. at 1182-37.
12. Id. at 1140. The court held that the permit denial prevented Estuary Properties from
realizing any beneficial use of part of its land and therefore amounted to an unconstitutional
taking without just compensation. Id.
13. 1981 Fla. L.W. 275 (6-1 decision). In regard to the statutory issues, the Florida
supreme court agreed with the district court's holding that the Adjudicatory Commission was
required to balance interests, but held that in this case there was no evidence of an absence of
such balancing. Id. at 1377-78. The court also agreed with the lower court's holding that the
state had the burden of proving the environmental impact, but held that the state must
only show that the granting of the permit will cause adverse environmental impact. Upon
such showing, the burden shifts to the developer to prove that the curative measures were
adequate. In the instant case, it was clear that the development would cause harm, so the
issue was whether the respondent could prove the interceptor waterway would adequately
cure the effects of destroying the black mangroves. Respondent failed to meet this burden. Id.
at 1379. The supreme court affirmed the district court's ruling that the failure of the Ajudicatory Commission to indicate the changes necessary to obtain a permit was improper and the
court remanded the case for further agency proceedings on that point. Id. at 1380.
The ruling regarding the burden of proof is the most significant, but, the decision's impact
is unclear. First, the supreme court used language giving little indication concerning the
nature and extent of the state's burden in proving the granting of a development of regional
impact (D.R.I.) would cause adverse environmental impact. Id. at 1378-80. Second, it is unclear
what effect, if any, this decision will have on other land use procedures, such as zoning. See
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Courts have been unable to develop an unambigious test for determining
14
when legislative action under the police power effects a taking of property.
Much of the judiciary's difficulty stems from the tension between substantive
due process' 0 and the compensation clause.'8 To be valid, a regulation promulgated under the police power must satisfy both the reasonableness requirements
of substantive due process- and avoid the taking prohibition of the compensation clause.' 8 Unfortunately, in practice, the due process and taking doctrines
often overlap and are difficult to distinguish.Early case law in the area avoided confusion between the two doctrines by
holding that legislation meeting substantive due process requirements could
not result in a taking.20 This approach incorporated the nuisance theory of
land use which maintained that a person should not use land in a manner
which harmed others. 21 Under this theory, any use which did harm to others
Kavanaugh, The Florida Land and Water Management Act: Local Decision-Making and the
DRI Process,55 FiA. B.J. 459 (1981).
14. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978). See
generally Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 149 (1971).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The due process clause provides that "[n]o person shall ... be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Id. Originally procedural in
nature, the due process clause was given its substantive flavor in a series of decisions at the
turn of the century. Due process has come to mean that the state's use of its police powers
must be fair and reasonable. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
381 (1978) [hereinafter cited as J. NOWAK].
16. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V. The taking clause provides that "private property [shall not]
be taken for public use without just compensation." Id. This limitation on state regulatory
power has been applied to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). The taking
clause theoretically applies only to eminent domain proceedings. The courts, however, have
universally construed the clause to include situations where a valid exercise of the police
power has an effect similar to eminent domain. See, e.g., Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of
New York, 39 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8-11, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 990 (1976). See generally Harris, Environmental Regulations, Zoning and Withheld Municipal Services: Takings of Property by
Multi-Government Action, 25 U. FLA. L. RaV. 635, 635-36 (1973). It is in this setting that the
tension arises. The police power allows the state to regulate land use if the regulation meets
the requirements of substantive due process. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926). The taking clause, on the other hand, limits the state's right to regulate by
requiring compensation to be paid where the regulation amounts to a taking. See Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 893 (1922). Due process allows broad state regulation of land
use, but the compensation clause mandates compensation for some restrictions. See generally
Stoebuck, PolicePower, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057 (1980).
17. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
18. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See note 16 supra.
19. Stoebuck, supra note 16, at 1081.
20. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53 (Mass. 1853). These early cases saw a
clear distinction between the police power and the power of eminent domain. Id. at 84. The
only time an exercise of the police power could be a taking was when the government action
led to appropriation. See Pumpely v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 166 (1871). For a
summation of the development of early taking doctrine see F. BOSSELMAN, D. CAWLIEs, &
J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 105-123 (1973) [hereinafter cited as F. Boss.LMa-AN].
21. C. TIEDMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF PossEx POWER IN THE UNITED STATES
12-13 (1886). This theory was originally based on the ancient legal maxim sic utere tuo, ut
alienum non laedas (use your own property in such a manner as not to injure the property
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could be lawfully restricted without causing a taking. In the landmark case of
Mugler v. Kansas, 22 the United States Supreme Court adopted this approach in
analyzing a brewer's challenge to a prohibition statute. As there existed a real
and substantial relationship between the prohibition statute and the protection
of public health, morals, and safety,23 the Court reasoned that the landowner
was only prohibited from a harmful, nuisance-like use of his property and not
denied any lawful use. 24 Thus, although the statute greatly diminished the
value of the brewer's property, the Court held there was no taking. The modern
version of this approach, the harm/benefit test,25 is based upon a broader notion
of harm than the original nuisance concept.2 6 Under the harm/benefit test, if
the government acts to prevent a harm, there is no taking, but if the govern2
ment's purpose is to provide a public benefit, compensation must be paid. 7
of another). Id. The doctrine is now commonly referred to as the nuisance or noxious use
theory. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1198 (1967).
22. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
23. Id. at 661. Mugler established as constitutional doctrine the rule that a valid exercise
of the police power could not be a taking. See F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 20, at 120.
24. 123 U.S. at 662. "[W]e cannot shut out of view the fact that the idleness, disorder,
pauperism, and crime existing in the country, are, in some degree at least, traceable to this
evil." Id.
25. See generally Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning,58 COLUM. L.
REV. 650, 664-66 (1958); Comment, Regulation of Land Use: From Magna Carta to a Just
Formulation,23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 904, 909-11 (1976). In 1904, Professor Freund laid the groundwork for this test with his oft-cited statement that "[t]he state takes property by eminent
domain because it is useful to the public, and under the police power because it is harmful."
E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 546 (1904). This distinction is essentially the same as developed
in the Mugler line of cases. "[It] is really not a novel approach . . . it is a particularization of
the Brandeis position in Pennsylvania Coal...; it is a rebirth of the old warhorse Mugler v.
"Usdin v. State Dep't of Envt'l Protection, 173 N.J. Super. 311, 321, 414 A.2d 280,
Kansas..
289 (1980).
Although the harm/benefit test has proved popular with courts, it has been generally
denigrated as conclusory by commentators. See, e.g., Plater, The Takings Issue in a Natural
Setting: Floodlines and the Police Power, 52 TEx. L. REv. 201, 237-39 (1974); Developments
in the Law -Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1427 (1978). The test has been considered more a
justification than a rule of decision. This view is justified by numerous cases involving similar facts treated by some courts as preventing harms, while others consider the same situation
the creation of a benefit. Compare Spears v. Berle, 63 A.D.2d 372, 407 N.Y.S.2d 590 (App. Div.
1978) rev'd on other grounds, 48 N.Y.2d 630, 397 N.E.2d 1304, 422 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1979) (wetlands statute held to bestow a public benefit) and Morris County Land Improvement v.
Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963) (regulation preventing
filling of wetlands was the creation of a benefit) with Foreman v. Department of Nat. Res.,
387 N.E.2d 455 (Ind. App. 1979) (regulation preventing use of floodway held to be prevention
of a harm) and Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (regulation preventing filling of a wetland was held to be the prevention of a harm). See generally Michelman, supra note 21, at 1196-1203.
26. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 134 n.30 (1978). See,
e.g., Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962) (upheld zoning plan preventing gravel company from operating because it harmed the reputation of a nearby community as a refuge for
sufferers of respiratory diseases).
27. See Michelman, supra note 21, at 1196.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol33/iss4/7

4

Siwica: Environmental Law: Wetlands Regulation Prevents Harm

1981]

CASE COMMENTS

In PennsylvaniaCoal v. Mahon,28 the Court's focus shifted from the legislation's purpose to its impact on individual property rights. 29 Pennsylvania Coal
involved a challenge to Pennsylvania's Kohler Act which forbade coal mining
beneath public and private structures. 30 Writing for the majority, Justice
Holmes went beyond Mugler holding that even if a regulation met the due
process reasonableness requirement, it could still be a taking if its impact
caused a sufficient diminution in property value. 31 Applying this law to the
facts, the Court found the Kohler Act, which, in effect, extinguished reserved
mineral rights, to be a taking.3 2 Surprisingly, the majority ignored Mugler;33
thus, after Pennsylvania Coal it was unclear exactly what the role of due process
was in taking analysis.3 4
Over the next 50 years the Court considered few land use cases,35 and it was
not until 1978, in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York, 36 that taking
analysis was thoroughly reexamined. The Penn Central controversy arose when
the New York City Preservation Committee vetoed a plan to build a 55 story
office building on top of a designated landmark37 In response, Penn Central
challenged New York City's historical preservation statute as a taking of private
property without just compensation." The Court rejected this claim finding

28. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
29. F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 29, at 293 "[In Pennsylvania Coal] the primary focus was
upon the regulation's effect upon a certain individual's property rights. The public purpose
and rationality of the statute were peripheral concerns." Id.
30. 260 U.S. at 412.
31. Id. at 413. This test has been both criticized as vague and applauded as flexible. See
Comment, supranote 25, at 913.
32. 260 U.S. at 413.
33. Justice Brandeis dissented. He considered this to be another case where the state was
regulating a nuisance through the police power. Brandeis cited Mugler for the proposition
that "restriction upon use does not become inappropriate as a means, merely because it deprives the owner of the only use to which his property can be profitably put." Id. at 418. See
F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 20, at 246-51.
34. Holmes' failure to deal with Mugler has been heavily criticized: "Mahon is hopelessly
at odds with Mugler v. Kansas. The United States Supreme Court placed in its constitutional
grab-bag a doctrine contrary to Mugler's, though the court to this date refuses to acknowledge
this contradiction. Without choosing between the two decisions, it must be said the decision
in Mahon begins the era of extreme confusion about police power takings that still exists. We
will have no peace about the matter until either Mahon or Mugler is overruled .... " Stoebuck, supra note 16, at 1063. Holmes' decision in Pennsylvania Coal has also been described
as "unfortunate". Lang, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City: Fairness and
Accommodation Show the Way Out of the Takings Corner, 13 URa. LJ.89, 93 (1981).
35. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (upheld regulation which
prohibited the operation of a gravel pit in an urbanized area); Nectow v. City of Cambridge,
277 U.S. 183 (1928) (application of zoning ordinance to particular lot constituted violation
of due process); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (upheld regulation which required the
destruction of cedar trees which hosted a parasite that damaged apple orchards); Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (zoning ordinance on its face not a violation of due process).
36. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
37. Id. at 112.
38. Id. at 119. Penn Central's main argument was that the denial of permission to con-
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that Penn Central had been denied neither a reasonable return on its prop40
erty3 9 nor use of the property as originally expected.
Unfortunately, Penn Central did not provide the anticipated clarification
of taking jurisprudence. From the outset, the Court admitted that its exhaustive review of the case law revealed no set formula to determine when a taking
occurs.

41

Rather than employing a specific test, the Court opted for a general

standard of fairness 42 which would be applied on an ad hoc basis. 43 The key
factor in the Court's determination of fairness, however, was the regulation's
impact on investment-backed expectations, 44 which was simply a modern rephrasing of the Pennsylvania Coal test. 5 The court's approval of Pennsylvania
Coal was further demonstrated by its preemptory handling or outright dismissal of several competing taking theories. 46 Nonetheless, the discordant
themes of Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal were neither addressed nor conclusively resolved.4?
The lack of any cogent federal taking doctrine has led to a confused
amalgam of state approaches. 48 The disarray has increased as courts have
struct the office building above the terminal was a taking of its air rights without just compensation. Id. at 131.
39. Id. at 137.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 125.
42. Id. The Court discussed taking cases which used the nuisance theory, such as Hadachek
and Euclid, in the same context with Pennsylvania Coal's diminution theory without noting
the inconsistency. Id. at 125-29. See Stoebuck, supra note 16, at 1068. The Court, however, later
discarded the rationales of the nuisance cases.
43. 438 U.S. at 124.
44. Id. The Court noted that two factors were of particular significance in determining
whether a taking has occurred: (1) the old test that government action amounting to a
physical invasion or an appropriation is a taking; and (2) the economic impact of the regulation, and particularly, the extent the regulation has interfered with investment-backed expectations. Id.
45. Id. at 130 n.27.
46. Id. at 130-37. The harm/benefit test was dominant among the rejected theories. Appellants claimed the landmark regulation created a benefit, therefore constituting a taking
without just compensation. The Court illustrated the conclusory nature of the test by disagreeing and ruling that the prevention of the destruction of a landmark was the prevention
of a harm. Id. at 134 n.30. See also Michelman, supra note 21, at 1199. For a discussion of the
impact of Penn Central on the harm/benefit test see Note, Cultural Ecology: The Urban
Landmark as an Environmental Resource, 11 U.S.F. L. Rav. 720, 787-89 (1977).
47. See Stoebuck, supra note 16, at 1069. "Whatever the merits of [the Penn Central]
doctrine, it fails to accommodate Mugler and Mahon .. . [and] until the Court resolves that
conflict we are, in the final analysis, just waiting for the other shoe to drop." Id. But see
Note, Police Power and Compensable Takings-A Landmark Decision Clarifies the Rules:
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 11 CONN. L. REv. 273, 289 (1979).
Since Penn Central, the Supreme Court has decided only one other taking case involving
land use regulation. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). That case did little to
resolve the conflict between Mugler and Mahon because the Court used a combination of
disparate approaches to uphold the zoning ordinance at issue. Id.
48. At least four broad types of taking tests can be identified: (1) physical invasion; (2)
harm/benefit; (3) diminution, and (4) balancing. The courts have not used these tests with
mutual exclusivity. Often more than one test is used in the same opinion despite potential
theoretical incongruity. See Michelman, supra note 22. See, e.g., Brecciaroli v. Commissioner

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol33/iss4/7

6

Siwica: Environmental Law: Wetlands Regulation Prevents Harm
CASE COMMENTS

struggled to reconcile taking law with modern environmental concerns.49 Environmental awareness has led some courts to reinterpret Pennsylvania Coal,
emphasizing residual benefits rather than magnitude of diminution.50 Other
courts have revived the Mugler nuisance approach by using the harm/benefit
test." ' The most significant step, however, has been the development of an ex52
panded concept of public rights.
The impetus behind the public rights approach was provided by the landmark case of Just v. Marinette County.5 3 In that case, the Wisconsin supreme
court upheld an ordinance prohibiting most shoreline development.5 4 In beof Envt'l Protection, 168 Conn. 849, 362 A.2d 948 (1975) (balancing and diminution used in
the same case); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (harm/benefit
and diminution used simultaneously).
49. See Large, This Land is Whose Land? Changing Concepts of Land as Property, 1978

Wis. L. REv. 1039, 1047. This trend is rooted in a greater realization of the ecosystem's importance and the need to protect it. Id. Some commentators, however, feel the pendulum may
be swinging too far in favor of environmental protection. See Harris, supra note 16, at 637.
50. F. MALONEY, S. PLAGER, R. AUSNss, & B. CANTER, FLORIDA WATER LAw 269 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as F. MALONEY]. This emphasis has been described "as a matter of judicial
perception; one court might view the glass as being half-empty, another, half-full." Id. See,
e.g., Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973) (flood plain regulation upheld despite an 88 percent reduction
in land value).
51. See note 25 supra.
52. See Large, supra note 49 at 1074. The doctrine of public rights was developed by
Professor Sax. See Sax, supra note 14. Conceptually, the doctrine is an extension of the
nuisance theory. See Stoebuck, supra note 16, at 1077. The public is said to have a right to be
free from any harmful "spillover effects" a landowner may produce. Sax, supra note 14, at
161. Professor Sax notes the courts protection of the titleholder's property rights and argues
that the public's interest in the land should also be protected: "[tjhe view proposed here
would recognize diffusely-held claims as public rights, entitled to equal consideration in legislative or judicial resolution of conflicting claims to the common resource base, without regard
to the manner in which they are held." Id. at 159. This proposition is clearly applicable to
wetlands cases where filling a wetland would harm the public by deteriorating the ecological
balance. Id. at 159-61. This approach has been described as "a systematic prescription for
defending the environment by narrowing the scope of just compensation law." Bryden, A
Phantom Doctrine: The Origins and Effects of Just v. Marinette County, 1978 Am. B.
FouupA'roN RESEARCa J. 397, 405.
Another common takings approach is to balance the public interest against the use restriction placed on the individual. Balancing has been described as a "false takings test."
Stoebuck, supra note 16, at 1065. Its roots are actually in substantive due process. See Miller
v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). Nonetheless, Holmes' Pennsylvania Coal opinion can be
interpreted to sanction some form of balancing. See F. BossEsmAN, supra note 20, at 256. But

see Comment, Balancing Private Loss Against Public Gain to Test for a Violation of Due
Process or a Taking Without Just Compensation, 54 WASH. L. Rnv. 815 (1979). The main
criticism of balancing is that it is inequitable because the public's interest will always outweigh the individual's. See Michelman, supra note 21, at 1196. Despite this criticism the
balancing test has proved popular with the courts. See, e.g., Brecciaroli v. Commissioner of
Envt'l Protection, 168 Conn. 349, 362 A.2d 948 (1975); Pope v. City of Atlanta, 242 Ga. 331,
249 S.E.2d 16 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979); State Dep't of Ecology v. Pacesetter
Constr. Co., 89 Wash. 2d 208,571 P.2d 196 (1977).
53. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
54. Id. at 9-13, 201 N.W.2d at 764-66. Wisconsin passed a comprehensive shoreland zoning
act requiring counties to regulate development of their shorelands pursuant to statewide
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ginning its analysis, the court announced the underlying principle that the
public had a right to the preservation of the ecosystem and, consequently, landowners had no absolute right to use their land for a purpose for which it was
unsuited in its natural state. 5 The court applied this notion in conjunction
with a harm/benefit test and concluded that the regulation prevented a harm
and, therefore, was a noncompensable exercise of the police power.56 Addressing
the landowners' reliance on Pennsylvania Coal, the court held that "value based
upon the changing character of the land was not an essential factor" 57 in the
diminution calculus.58 In other words, the landowners' expectations of profit
from developing the wetlands were a mere economic right and not a property
right deserving of legal protection.5 9 This novel approach recognized a public
60
property right superior to the titleholder's.
Until recently, little weight has been given to environmental concerns in
Florida taking decisions. Although Florida courts have generally followed the
reasonable beneficial use test,61 in the few cases involving environmental restrictions, the state action was held to be a taking. 6 2 Lately, however, Florida's
lower appellate courts have begun to recognize the importance of ecological
interests.63 Consequently, this development was ripe for consideration by the
Florida supreme court.
minimum standards. Marinette County's ordinance divided the shorelands into three types:
general purpose, recreation, and conservancy. The Justs owned property in a conservancy
district and were enjoined from filling some of their marshland without a permit. Id. at 9-14,
201 N.W.2d at 764-67.
55. Id. at 17, 201 N.W.2d at 768. These passages have been the subject of considerable
commentary. See Bryden, supra note 52, at 407-09 (Just "contracts the scope of constitutional
rights for the sake of environmental quality."); Freeman, Give and Take: Distributing Local
Environmental Control Through Land-Use Regulation, 60 MINN. L. REv. 883, 959-60 (1976)
(the government can now, without compensation, prevent a wetland owner from making any
remunerative use of his property); Large, supra note 49, at 1074-82 ("This change, if applicable to all land, would be little short of revolutionary.").
56. 56 Wis. 2d at 14-23, 201 N.W.2d at 767-71.
57. Id. at 23, 201 N.W.2d at 771.
58. Although it seems the application of the harm/benefit test in Just precluded any
other result under the diminution test, commentary suggests the two approaches are complementary. See Large, supra note 49, at 1076-77.
59. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979) (citing United States v.
Willow River Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945) ("But not all economic interests are 'property
rights'; only those economic advantages are 'right' which have the law back of them, and
only when they are so recognized may courts compel others to forbear from interfering with
them or to compensate for their invasion.")).
60. See Large, supra note 49, at 1074.
61. F. MALONEY, supra note 51), at 270.
62. See, e.g., Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Nay. Control Auth., 171 So. 2d 376 (Fla.
1965) (denial of permit to dredge and fill bottom lands and to repair a bulkhead line to enlarge a trailer park was ruled a taking); Alford v. Finch, 155 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1963) (a Game
and Fresh Water Fish Commission order designating private property a "game management
area" was held a taking); Askew v. Gables-by-the-Sea, Inc., 333 So. 2d 56 (Fla. Ist D.C.A.
1976) (denial of permit to dredge and fill submerged lands permanently denied any use of
the land and therefore constituted a taking).
63. See Smith v. City of Clearwater, 383 So. 2d 681, 685 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1980) (the court
recognized "serious environmental considerations" as justification for rezoning wetlands as
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In the instant case, the court openly acknowledged the lack of a settled
formula for determining when an otherwise valid exercise of the police
power becomes a taking. 64 The court announced, however, that the reasonableness of the regulation was the underlying theme in taking analysis.6 5
To determine reasonableness, the court first focused on whether the regulation was a valid exercise of the police power by examining whether it promoted
a goal within the public welfare 6 in a nonarbitrary manner. 67 Initially, the
court noted that pollution prevention is a legitimate state concern.s Because
the proposed development would have caused pollution, which would have
harmed the Lee County economy, 69 the court ruled that the regulation promoted the public welfare and had not been arbitrarily applied.70 Therefore, the
71
statute was held a valid exercise of the police power.
Recognizing that a valid regulation could still effect a taking, the court
next applied PennsylvaniaCoal's diminution in value test to the reasonableness
determination. Examining respondent's entire property, the court observed
that half of property was upland and, therefore, unaffected by environmental
72
restrictions. Accordingly, Pennsylvania Coal, along with several Florida cases,
was distinguished as involving a total preclusion of property rights. 73 Additionally, the court noted that respondent had known at the time of purchase

"aquatic lands" usable only for xecreation); Moviematic Indus. Corp. v. Board of Co. Comm'rs,
349 So. 2d 667, 669 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977) (respecting ecology and preserving the ecological

system are objectives whose time has come); Hillsborough County Envt'l Protection v.
Frandorson Properties, 288 So. 2d 65, 68 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1978) (the state has the power to
forbid the destruction of mangroves to promote the quality of our environment, even by a

landowner upon his own property).
64. 399 So. 2d at 1880. See notes 14-19 supra. The court also announced that the taking
analysis would be made on an ad hoc basis. 1981 Fla. L.W. at 278.

65. Id. at 1382.
66. Id. at 1381 (citing Newman v. Carson, 280 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1973) (statute requiring
pawnbrokers to keep records of those who regularly buy and sell goods upheld as expedient
for the protection of public safety, welfare, morals, and health)).
67. Id. (citing Varholy v. Sweat, 153 Fla. 571, 15 So. 2d 276 (1948) (statute requiring

prison inmates to be quarantined upon a finding of venereal disease upheld as not violating
the constitutional guarantees that personal liberty and private property cannot be unreasonably and arbitrarily invaded)).
68. Id. (citing Moviematic Indust. Corp. v. Board of C6unty Comm'rs., 349 So. 2d 667

(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977)).
69.
70.

Id.
Id.

71. Id. The court also used the harm/benefit test in concluding that the regulation was
a valid exercise of the police power. See note 83 infra.
72. The court distinguished Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Navigation Control Auth.,
171 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1965), and Askew v. Gables-By-The-Sea, Inc., 383 So. 2d 56 (1st D.C.A.
1976), cert. denied, 845 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1977). Both cases involved owners of bottom lands
who had been denied permission to fill, but the courts held the denials to be takings. The
cases were distinguished from the instant case on three bases: (1) in both cases the regulated
land had been purchased from the state; (2) in both cases the regulation denied the landowner a reasonable use of the property; and (3)in both cases the land was completely sub.
merged and totally useless without the right to fill. 399 So. 2d at 1378-79.
73. 399 So. 2d at 1381.
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that portions of the tract might be undevelopable.74 Therefore, respondent
could not validly claim its investment-backed expectations were reasonable.75
As further support for its finding under the diminution in value test, the
court questioned whether the purported use was reasonable.76 To resolve this
issue the court relied on the controversial statement in Just that a landowner
has no absolute right to alter the land's natural state if the change would result
in a public harm.7 7 Because mangrove destruction would have led to pollution, 7 the court concluded the planned development was an unreasonable use
of the property.7 9 Therefore, the court held that the instant reduction of the
development by one-half was not a taking.
The court emphasized, however, the critical factor was not the size of the
reduction but the presence of a public harm.8 0 Recognizing that courts have
had difficulty in differentiating between a public benefit and a public harm, the
court offered the following construct to help delineate the distinction: the
prevention of a public harm necessarily confers a public benefit, but the creation of a public benefit does not necessarily prevent a public harm.," The court
further explained that the benefit attributable to the prevention of a harm was
only the maintenance of the status quo and that compensation must only be
paid for a benefit expanding public rights beyond the scope of the police
power.8 2 Applying this test to the instant facts, the court held that the permit
74. Id. The court distinguished the instant case from Zabel v. Pinellas County Water &
Navigation Control Auth., 171 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1965); and Askew v. Gables-By-The-Sea, Inc.,
333 So. 2d 56 (1st D.C.A. 1976), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1977). Id. In those cases
the landowner had legitimate investment-backed expectations. In Zabel there was a statutory
right to fill the wetland in question at the time it was purchased. The instant case differed
because respondent knew the land was unfit for development when it purchased the land
and had only its own subjective expectation that the land could be developed. Id. at 1379.
75. See Odom v. Deltona Corp., 341 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1976). In Odom the state conveyed
property to plaintiff developer and acquiesced in its development for a number of years before
attempting to regain the land under the navigable servitude doctrine. The court held the
state was equitably estopped from renouncing its earlier actions. "[G]rants of title to real
property without any reservation of public rights in and to waters thereon should not be
upset because of new standards of value relating to ecology ... and other issues of current
importance to Florida." Id. at 989.
76. 399 So. 2d at 1382.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1381. See note 7 supra.
79. 399 So. 2d at 1381. To illustrate a situation where sufficient diminution would
exist to compel the finding of an invalid expression of the police power, the court examined
the facts of Alford v. Finch, 155 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1963) (regulation requiring land to be a
game preserve held to be a taking). In that case, plaintiff's land was being used for hunting
and fishing, but a regulation transformed it, but not the neighboring property, into a wildlife
preserve. The magnitude of the harm in the instant case in conjunction with its interrelationship with the sensitive environment was described as not unreasonable when compared to the
facts in Alford. Id at 1382-83.
80. Id. at 1382. The court first introduced the harm/benefit test as a measure of whether
the regulation met the "standards required for the police power" then later mentioned it in
the middle of the diminution discussion. Id. at 1381-82.
81. Id. at 279.
82. Id. To illustrate, the court considered the facts of Alford v. Finch, 155 So. 2d 790
(Fla. 1963). See note 79 supra. In that case the plaintiff was required to transfer his land to a
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denial was the prevention of a harm, water pollution, rather than the creation
of an affirmative public benefit, such as a recreational area. 83
A dose examination of the instant case reveals that the court blended due
process with the compensation clause in formulating the reasonableness theme
of its taking analysis. 8 4 This blending indicates confusion concerning the role
of due process in a taking decision. 8 In the midst of this confusion, the court
has significantly altered the course of Florida taking jurisprudence: first, by
applying the harm/benefit test to taking; and second, by modifying the
diminution in value test to reflect Just's conception of property rights.
The court's failure to clearly delineate the role of due process in a taking
case must be examined. Perhaps the court thought taking analysis derived from
both the compensation and due process clauses. This approach, however, undermines the potency of the compensation clause as an independent protector
of property rights.8s Adding due process considerations to the equation dilutes
the compensation clause's prominence. Ultimately, weakening the compensation clause can only signal an increased judicial deference to legislative regulation of property rights. Another consequence of blending the two clauses is
further loosening of the already unstructured style of legal analysis in the
taking area. In fact, one commentator has criticized the blending approach as
"scarcely better than an arbitrary conclusion."87 In light of these considerations,
it must be concluded that the court's reasonableness formula will not add certainty to taking law.
Additional uncertainty will be fostered by introducing two new taking tests
when the instant facts did not necessitate the reevaluation of past taking doc-

trine. Because the respondent was only denied the use of half his land, this case
falls neatly under the existing reasonable remaining use standard.8 8 Further,
respondent's knowledge of the land's unsuitability for complete development
game preserve, thus conferring a benefit upon the public, while his neighbors were not required to transfer their property. The instant case was distinguished as a situation where the

landowner sought to alter the status quo by modifying his land in such a way which adversely affected his neighbors. 399 So. 2d at 1382.
83. 899 So. 2d at 1382. The court stated "the regulation at issue here promotes the
welfare of the public, prevents a public harm, and has not been arbitrarily applied ...[and
therefore] complies with the standards required for the police power." Id. at 1381.
84. For a discussion of blending of the two clauses, see Finne 1I, The FederalRegulatory
Role in CoastalLand Management, 1978 AM. B. FOUNDATiON REsEARCH J. 169, 221-24; Stoebuck,
supra note 17 at 1081-83; Comment, DistinguishingEminent Domain From Police Power and
Tort, 88 WAsH. L. REV. 607 (1968).
85. See Stoebuck, supra note 16, at 1081.

86. PennsylvaniaCoal first enshrined the compensation clause as the protection of private
property. Developments, supra note 25, at 1478.
87. Stoebuck, supra note 16, at 1081.

88. With a loss of the use of only 50% of the land, the regulation clearly would not have
precluded all beneficial use as required for a taking under the reasonable remaining benefit
interpretation of the diminution test. See, e.g., In re Loveladies Harbor, Inc., 176 N.J. Super.
69, 422 A.2d 107 (1980) (appellants were denied permission to fill in 51 acres of wetland
property, but the court held there was no taking because a permit would have been granted

for an alternate plan allowing the fill of 12.5 acres of property, thus allowing the appellants
considerable use of their land).
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negates the possible existence of reasonable investment-backed expectations. 9
Thus, the court could have reached the same result without breaking new
ground.
This point can be demonstrated by examining the ramifications of the two
newly adopted taking tests. Under the harm/benefit approach, a valid regulation cannot be a taking if it is designed to prevent a public harm as opposed to
creating a public benefit. 9° The instant court redefined this test by providing
that a taking occurs only when a benefit accrues without a harm being prevented.91 Proceeding logically from this construct is the proposition that if the
legislature acts to prevent a harm, there can be no taking even if the public is
simultaneously awarded a benefit. 92 Essentially, this would remove the taking
issue from environmental land use restriction controversies because such regu93
lations are universally designed to prevent ecological harm.
The second test, the Just reformulation of the reasonable remaining use
standard, produces the same result. Under this test, no use that injures the
public is considered reasonable and entitled to legal protection as a property
right.9 4 Because environmental controls are designed to prevent uses harming

the public, any uses forbidden by such legislation would not qualify as property
95
rights worthy of constitutional protection.
89. See note 74 supra.
90. See note 25 supra.
91. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
92. The only time a taking could exist under this interpretation of the harm/benefit test
is when a regulation creates a benefit without preventing a harm. See, e.g., Alford v. Finch,
155 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1963). See note 82 supra.
93. The potential for this extreme interpretation has been noted by many commentators.
See Michelman, supra note 21, at 1199 (it is impossible to distinguish between preventing
harm and extracting benefit); Rose, When are Environmental Restrictions on Land Use Compensable?, 9 REAL EsT. L.J. 233, 237 (1980) (every police power regulation has positive benefits
and avoids negative impact); Comment, supra note 25, at 910-11 (the concept of harm is sufficiently ambiguous to encompass nearly any use and with the evolving concept of public
rights regulations may be upheld automatically). As an example of such an extreme interpretation of public harm consider McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d
932 (1954) (ordinance restricting beach front property for recreational purposes upheld because it prevented the public harm, inter alia, of possible promiscuous conduct in the areas
under the beachfront piers).
94. See notes 57-60 and accompanying text, supra.
95. See Bryden, supra note 52, at 399 (the Just notion authorizes any destruction of
property values by regulations designed to conserve open space; the doctrine is a major shift
in constitutional doctrine with potentially enormous implications for land use controls in
general and environmental regulations in particular); Comment, supra note 25, at 929 (any
potential value of the land as altered is not sufficient to outweigh public rights where the land
is still in its natural state); Comment, Land Use - Wetlands Regulation, 27 ARK. L. Rlv. 527,
537 (1973) (Just adopts a very broad view of the police power; where valuable public rights
are at stake, any use in derogation of the land's natural state is unreasonable). Not all commentators, however, believe Just intended such a devastating threat to individual property
rights. See Large, supra note 49, at 1076-77 (the court did not intend to give a blank check to
the legislature that would obviate the need for compensation simply because a statute was
couched in regulatory language; the court recognized that at some point a proposed regulation
might still be a constructive taking). For a criticism of the Just doctrine, see Costonis, "Fair"
Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land
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The disparity between the court's holding and the ultimate consequences
of the decision is manifest. Although the court held the deprivation of the use
of one half of a person's property for environmental reasons was not a taking,96
the new tests potentially would allow complete destruction of property rights
if the governmental purpose is the prevention of harm.97 Nonetheless, it is
apparent that the court never intended to extend its approval to such results.
Two previous cases, which held that restrictions on the use of land for environmental reasons were takings, were distinguished by the court, not overruled. s
In essence, the court's formulation of the taking test resulted in an endorsement of expansive regulatory prerogative. The decision clearly indicates the
state can invoke environmental criteria when exercising the police power. The
instant case, however, has left Florida taking jurisprudence in a state of disarray. Principally, the concept of a public right in the maintenance of the
ecological status quo has obscured the role of the compensation clause as a
guarantor of fairness to individual property owners. 99 Nonetheless, on balance,
the court is to be applauded for giving needed impetus to the protection of
Florida's greatest asset, its environment.
RICHARD P. SiwicA
Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. Rav. 1021, 1047 (1975) (doctrinal schizophrenia as the courts

try to protect private rights with the compensation clause and at the same time widen the
police power to effectuate the public interest in resource protection). The potential for an
expansive interpretation of the police power has been reflected in several recent decisions.
See Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975) (upheld regulation denying plaintiff
permission to fill a four acre salt marsh; citing Just, the court held that the denial prevented
a major change in the marsh that plaintiffs sought to make for speculative profit); Usdin v.
State Dep't of Envt'l Protection, Div. of Water Resources, 173 N.J. Super. 311, 414 A.2d 280
(1980) (upheld regulation barring construction of a warehouse in a flood plain; the court
cited Just recognizing the reasonableness under the circumstances limiting plaintiffs to the
land's natural use. The regulation prevented the misuse of nature; therefore, it was a proper
exercise of the police power, rather than a compensable taking).
96. 399 So. 2d at 1381.
97. See note 93 supra. "The approach to the taking problem and the result, may be different where vital ecological and environmental considerations of recent cognizance have
brought about rather drastic land use restrictions in furtherance of a policy designed to
protect important public interests wide in scope and territory.' Usdin v. State Dep't of Envt'l
Protection, Div. of Water Recources, 173 NJ. Super. at 319, 414 A.2d at 286 (1980) (emphasis
in original).
98. See note 72 supra.
99. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 2837 (1980) (Brennan. J.,

concurring). "For a civilization founded upon principles of ordered liberty to survive and
flourish, its members must share the conviction that they are governed equitably. That necessity underlies constitutional provisions as diverse as the rule against takings without just
compensation, and the Equal Protection Clause." Id.
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